rootpls

Brent Wadleigh, 0xROOTPLS. Red team logistics, offensive software development, defensive software development, evasion, mitigation, bug bounty hunting and exploit development.

  • C
  • C++
  • C#/.NET
  • Rust
  • Python
  • NASM

github/0xROOTPLS [email protected]

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About

I work at the layer where the documentation stops helping. Process internals, binary formats, allocators, the parts of the operating system you have to decompile to understand. Most of what I ship is small, complex, and single-purpose. Some larger projects are under my belt as well.

Red team by instinct, blue team by obligation. Optimization and evasion get most of my attention. Every project I publish is backed by numbers or a test.

Areas of practice

Where I've spent the time and shipped the tools.

AI systems
LLMs and generative work; classical ML: random forests, CNNs, KNNs, gradient boosting.
Evasion
Endpoint EDR and OS-level.
Optimization
Obscure mathematics that outperform textbook practice.
Architecture
Client-server design, secure application development, secure network communications.
Reverse eng.
Ghidra, IDA, ILSpy, angr.
Low level
Assembly and shellcode, in-memory work.
Defense
Mitigation research; anti-cheat, static and ML-driven.

Currently taking a limited amount of freelance contract work around tooling, internals research and systems design.

Selected work

  1. Fritter

    • C
    • NASM

    A heavily modified fork of TheWover and Odzhan's Donut shellcode generator.

    Every EDR knows Donut. What if we change the definition?

  2. A Win64 call-stack spoofing technique that hides the consumer module from a thread's reconstructed call tree without modifying any DLL memory.

    Every other spoofer wins the call tree and loses the page-hash. That trade is the whole reason to write Cuckoo.

  3. stackrb

    • C
    • NASM

    An x64 PIC payload that resolves kernel32 through ntdll's LdrpModuleBaseAddressIndex red-black tree.

    The PEB walk is the first path an EDR sees. This research reads the loader's own tree instead.

  4. Jinx-C2

    • Rust

    A modern post-exploitation framework built OPSEC-first, not as a checklist appended after the demo runs.

    What happens when the C2 server is offensively… defensive?

Contact